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Abstract
Emotions such as anger and happiness have pervasive interpersonal eVects in negotiations. We propose that the nature of the eVects
depends on the target of the emotion, that is, whether the emotion is directed toward a person or a speciWc behavior. In a computer-
mediated negotiation (N D 87), participants received either angry or happy messages from a simulated opponent, which were either
behavior-oriented or person-directed. Behavior-oriented anger elicited larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness, whereas
person-directed anger elicited smaller concessions than person-directed happiness. This reversal could be attributed to the strategic value
of the emotional expression, which was higher in the behavior-oriented condition than in the person-directed condition. These Wndings
show that the interpersonal eVects of anger and happiness depend critically on the target of the emotion.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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ConXicts occur on a daily basis, throughout all levels of
society. ConXicts often bring about intense emotional reac-
tions, which may strongly aVect the individuals involved.
Given that conXicts are often infused with emotions, it is
important to understand how these emotions may shape
conXict development and resolution. One of the most com-
mon and constructive ways of resolving conXict is through
negotiation, which may be deWned as “a discussion
between two or more parties with the apparent aim of
resolving a divergence of interests” (Pruitt & Carnevale,
1993, p. 2). Although an increasing amount of research
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doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.12.002indicates that emotions play a crucial role in negotiation,
Wndings are ambiguous when it comes to the nature of
these eVects. While some research indicates that expres-
sions of negative emotions such as anger elicit more coop-
erative responses than do expressions of positive emotions
such as happiness (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van
Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, Van Kleef, De Dreu,
& Manstead, 2004b), other research suggests that positive
rather than negative emotions elicit cooperation (e.g.,
Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). We argue that
the interpersonal eVects of emotions in negotiation depend
on how these emotions are communicated. More speciW-
cally, inspired by Fisher and Ury’s (1981) classic advise to
“separate the people from the problem” in negotiation, we
test the idea that the eVects of a counterpart’s anger vs.
happiness on a focal negotiator’s demands depend on the
target of the emotion, that is, whether the emotion is
directed at the negotiator’s oVers or at the negotiator as a
person.
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In the last decade or so, researchers have become
increasingly interested in the social eVects of emotions,
addressing the question how one individual’s emotions may
inXuence others’ cognitions, impressions, and behavior
(Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Keltner & Haidt, 1999;
Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b).
The basic premise of this perspective is that emotions have
important social functions and consequences (Frijda, 1986;
Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Parkinson,
1996), by which they may inXuence not only the behavior of
those experiencing the emotion but also the behavior of
others (Levenson, 1994). At the interpersonal level emo-
tions convey information to others about an individual’s
feelings (Ekman, 1993), social intentions (Fridlund, 1994;
Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and orientation toward the rela-
tionship (Knutson, 1996). Further, emotional expressions
may evoke reciprocal or complementary emotions in others
that may in turn help individuals respond adaptively to
social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Finally, emotions can
serve as positive or negative reinforcers of other individu-
als’ behavior (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda,
1983). More speciWcally, positive emotions may encourage
others to continue their course of action, whereas negative
emotions may serve as a call for behavioral adjustment
(Averill, 1982; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).
How do these emotional mechanisms play out in the
context of conXict and negotiation? There is abundant evi-
dence that one negotiators’ expressions of anger trigger
reciprocal anger, negative impressions, and feelings of hos-
tility in the opponent (e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, &
Raia, 1997; Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006;
Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Accordingly, studies by
Friedman et al. and Kopelman et al. have found that
expressions of anger (compared to expressions of happi-
ness) reduced the likelihood of settlement and elicited com-
petitive behavior. For example, Kopelman et al. showed
that participants in a face-to-face dispute simulation, an
ultimatum bargaining setting, and a distributive negotia-
tion were less likely to close a deal and to make concessions
to partners who displayed negative rather than positive
emotions.
The pervasive eVects of emotions on reciprocal feelings
and impressions notwithstanding, these aVective reactions
do not always become manifest in behavior. A growing
body of research suggests that these gut reactions may be
overruled by strategic considerations. As mentioned earlier,
emotions convey information about a person’s intentions,
and they may serve as incentives or deterrents for other’s
behavior. Especially in situations in which negotiators lack
relevant strategic information about their opponent’s bar-
gaining position, they turn to other sources of information
to locate the opponent’s limits (Liebert, Smith, Hill, &
KeiVer, 1968; Pruitt & Syna, 1985; Yukl, 1974), a behavior
that is referred to as tracking (see Pruitt, 1981). For
instance, when an opponent reacts happily to one’s oVer,one may assume that the current oVer is within the oppo-
nent’s limits. When an opponent reacts angrily to one’s
oVer, however, one may assume that this oVer is disadvan-
tageous to him or her. Expressions of anger may thus signal
that one has high limits and alert opponents to possible
negative consequences (e.g., conXict escalation, an unproWt-
able impasse), which may lead them to concede. In order to
avoid costly impasse it may thus be necessary to place
lower demands and make larger concessions to an angry
opponent than to a happy opponent. Thus, the information
that emotions provide can trigger strategic considerations
that may overrule the powerful aVective tendencies dis-
cussed above. In support of this notion, Van Kleef et al.
(2004a) showed that negotiators who were confronted with
an angry (as opposed to a happy) opponent became angry
themselves, but decided to give in because they inferred that
the other had ambitious limits (meaning that standing Wrm
would jeopardize agreement). In other words, in a negotia-
tion context expressions of anger may signal higher limits
than expressions of happiness, and this may in turn guide
negotiators’ behavior.
The present study
As we have seen, previous research has yielded inconsis-
tent Wndings regarding the interpersonal eVects of anger
and happiness on negotiation behavior, with some studies
showing that anger (as opposed to happiness) elicits com-
petition (e.g., small concessions), and other studies showing
that anger elicits cooperation (e.g., large concessions). We
suggest that these inconsistent Wndings may in part be rec-
onciled by considering the focus or target of the emotion,
and concomitantly, the prominence of the strategic infor-
mation that is provided by negotiators’ emotions. One of
the deWning characteristics of emotions is that they are
directed at a particular target or object, most often a person
or a situation (Frijda, 1986). This intentionality or object-
directedness is especially relevant in relation to the infor-
mation-providing functions of emotions. If we accept that
emotions regulate social interactions by providing informa-
tion (Keltner & Haidt, 1999), it becomes relevant to con-
sider the focus or target of the emotion. That is, the
meaning and interpretation of an emotion may diVer as a
function of whether the emotion is directed toward a per-
son or a situation. SpeciWcally, in a negotiation setting
anger and happiness may carry diVerent information
depending on whether they are directed toward a negotia-
tor’s behavior or toward the negotiator as a person.
We argue that the former type of emotional expression,
which we will refer to as behavior-oriented emotion, carries
clear strategic information. That is, a counterpart’s anger
or happiness are likely to be interpreted as signaling
(dis)satisfaction with one’s oVer, which negotiators can use
to track the counterpart’s limits (Pruitt, 1981) and modify
their bargaining behavior accordingly. Thus, when the
opponent’s emotions are directed toward the focal negotia-
tor’s oVers or demands, we expect the focal negotiator to
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than to a happy one.
In contrast, when the opponent’s emotion is directed
toward the focal negotiator as a person (person-directed emo-
tion), the strategic implications of the emotion are much less
clear in the sense that the emotions are not readily attribut-
able to the focal negotiator’s behavior. As a result, negotia-
tors cannot use the opponent’s emotion to track his or her
limit (Pruitt, 1981; Van Kleef et al., 2004a) and they may
therefore be less likely to strategically modify their behavior
in accordance with the other’s emotion. As the diagnostic
value of the emotion is thus impaired, we expect the negative
eVects of anger (see Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al.,
2006) to become more apparent, resulting in negotiators con-
ceding less to an angry counterpart than to a happy one.
Based on the above, we advance the following predic-
tions. First, we predict that participants who are presented
with behavior-oriented emotional expressions will make
smaller demands to an angry opponent than to a happy one
(Hypothesis 1a). In contrast, participants who are presented
with person-directed emotional expressions are expected to
make larger demands to an angry opponent than to a happy
one (Hypothesis 1b). Further, based on the assumption that
behavior-oriented emotions provide more diagnostic infor-
mation than person-directed emotions, we hypothesize that
participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits will be
aVected by the former type of emotional expression but not
by the latter. SpeciWcally, we predict that participants who
are presented with behavior-oriented emotions will judge the
opponent’s limits to be higher when the opponent expresses
anger rather than happiness, whereas we do not expect to
Wnd such an eVect for person-directed emotions (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, we expect participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s
limits to mediate the relation between the opponent’s emo-
tion and concessions for behavior-oriented emotions but not
for person-directed emotions (Hypothesis 3).
Methods
Participants and experimental design
Eighty-seven undergraduate students at Leiden Univer-
sity (n D 18 male and n D 69 female; aged M D 19.16 years,
SD D 3.43) participated in the study for monetary compen-
sation (6D, equivalent to 8 US$ at the time of the experi-
ment). The design included the opponent’s emotion (anger
vs. happiness) and the target of the emotion (behavior-ori-
ented vs. person-directed) as between-participants variables
and demands as the dependent variable. Additional depen-
dent variables included appraisals of the opponent’s limits
and manipulation checks. Participants were randomly
assigned to the conditions using a double-blind procedure.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were welcomed to the experi-
ment and seated in separate cubicles in front of a computer,which presented all instructions. Participants read that the
purpose of the experiment was to study negotiation in a situ-
ation where the negotiating parties could not see each other,
and they were led to believe that they would engage in a
computer-mediated negotiation with another participant
(whose behavior was in fact simulated by the computer).
Negotiation task
The negotiation task was an adapted version of the one
used by Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b; see also De Dreu
and Van Lange, 1995; Hilty and Carnevale, 1993), which
captures the main characteristics of real-life negotiation
(i.e., multiple issues diVering in utility to the negotiator,
information about one’s own payoVs only, and the typical
oVer-counteroVer sequence). In the current version, partici-
pants learned that they would be assigned the role of seller
of a consignment of cell phones, and that they had to nego-
tiate the price, the warranty period, and the duration of the
service contract of the phones. Participants were then pre-
sented with a payoV chart (see Table 1) that showed them
which outcomes were most favorable to them, and were
told that their objective was to earn as many points as pos-
sible. As can be seen in Table 1, level 9 on price ($110)
yielded 0 points and level 1 ($150) yielded 400 points. For
warranty period, level 9 (nine months) yielded 0 points, and
level 1 (one month) yielded 120 points. Finally, for duration
of service contract, level 9 (nine months) yielded 0 points,
and level 1 (one month) yielded 240 points. The payoV table
for the opponent was not shown, and participants were told
only that it diVered from their own.
To enhance involvement, participants were informed
that points would be converted to lottery tickets, and that
the more points earned, the more lottery tickets one would
obtain, and the greater would be one’s chance of winning a
prize of 30D (approximately 40 US$). To emphasize the
mixed-motive nature of the negotiation, participants were
told that reaching an agreement is a prerequisite for partici-
pation in the lottery. Thus, on the one hand there was an
incentive to earn as many points as possible, whereas on the
other hand there was an incentive to reach agreement.
Table 1
Participants’ payoV chart
Note. Prices in Euro were converted to US dollars and rounded to the
nearest US $5.
Level Price of phones Warranty period Service contract
Price PayoV Warranty 
(months)
PayoV Service 
(months)
PayoV
1 $150 400 1 120 1 240
2 $145 350 2 105 2 210
3 $140 300 3 90 3 180
4 $135 250 4 75 4 150
5 $130 200 5 60 5 120
6 $125 150 6 45 6 90
7 $120 100 7 30 7 60
8 $115 50 8 15 8 30
9 $110 0 9 0 9 0
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would make the Wrst oVer and that the negotiation would
continue until an agreement was reached or until time ran
out. Just before the negotiation started, participants
learned that an additional goal of the study was to examine
the eVects of having vs. not having information about the
opponent’s intentions. They read that the computer had
randomly determined that they would receive information
about the intentions of the opponent without the opponent
knowing it, and that the opponent would not receive infor-
mation about their intentions.
Participants then received a Wrst oVer from their alleged
counterpart (the computer). Over the negotiation rounds
the buyer proposed the following levels of agreement (for
price – warranty – service): 8-7-8 (Round 1), 8-7-7 (Round
2), 8-6-7 (Round 3), 7-6-7 (Round 4), 7-6-6 (Round 5), and
6-6-6 (Round 6). Research has shown that this prepro-
grammed strategy has face validity and is seen as intermedi-
ate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu &
Van Lange, 1995). A demand by the participant was
accepted if it equaled or exceeded the oVer the computer
was about to make in the next round. After the sixth round,
the negotiation was interrupted regardless of whether par-
ticipants had reached an agreement (cf. De Dreu & Van
Lange, 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Following
Tripp and Sondak (1992), participants who reached an
agreement before Round 6 (n D 6) were excluded from the
analyses. (Retaining those participants did not change the
pattern of results reported below.)
Manipulations
After the Wrst, third, and Wfth negotiation round, partici-
pants received information about “the intentions of the
buyer,” which contained the manipulations of the buyer’s
emotion (anger vs. happiness) and of the target of the emo-
tion (behavior-oriented vs. person-directed). Participants
waited while the opponent was supposedly asked to reveal
what he or she intended to oVer in the next round, and why.
Shortly afterwards, participants received the answer sup-
posedly given by the buyer, which was presented in a sepa-rate box, in a diVerent font, and which contained some
typing errors to enhance experimental realism. The buyer’s
intentions were held constant across conditions and con-
tained the buyer’s intended oVer for the next round. That is,
after Round 1 the buyer wrote “I think I will oVer 8-7-7,”
which would indeed be the buyer’s next oVer. The buyer’s
intention also contained an emotional statement which
constituted the experimental manipulation.
After the Wrst negotiation round, participants in the
angry opponent conditions received the following informa-
tion: “This [oVer/person] makes me really angry.” In the
happy opponent conditions, participants read “I am happy
with this [oVer/person].” As can be seen from these exam-
ples, the target of the emotion was also manipulated in the
emotional statements by focusing the opponent’s emotion
either on the participant’s oVers and behavior (“This oVer
makes me really angry”) or on the participant as a person
(e.g., “This person makes me really angry”). The statements
were adapted from Van Kleef et al. (2004a) and are listed in
Table 2.
Dependent measures
Participants’ demands in each of the six rounds were
transformed into an index revealing the negotiator’s total
demand for that round (i.e., the sum of the number of
points asked for each issue; see Table 1). Demands in the six
rounds were in turn combined into an index of the negotia-
tor’s average demands (see e.g. De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans,
& Van De Vliert, 1994; Van Kleef et al., in press). In addi-
tion, participants completed a post-negotiation question-
naire which contained a number of items designed to
measure participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits,
and manipulation checks.
Participants’ estimates of the opponent’s limits were
measured with six items, two for each issue (”What do you
think was the buyer’s lowest acceptable level of agreement
on [price/warranty/service]?” and “How far do you think
the buyer is prepared to concede on [price/warranty/
service]?”). Responses could range from 1 (indicating an
extremely low limit) to 9 (indicating an extremely highTable 2
Statements used for the manipulation of the opponent’s emotion
Note. Statements were adapted from the original Dutch statements used by Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b). Words in brackets before the slash were used
in the behavior-oriented emotion condition. Words in brackets after the slash were used in the person-directed emotion condition. The opponent’s
intended oVer corresponded with the actual oVer in the next round.
Emotion
After round 1
Anger This [oVer/person] makes me really angry, I think I will oVer 8-7-7
Happiness I am happy with this [oVer/person], I think I will oVer 8-7-7
After round 3
Anger This [behavior/person] is really getting on my nerves. I am going to oVer 7-6-7
Happiness This [behavior/person] pleases me. It is going pretty well so far. I am going to oVer 7-6-7
After round 5
Anger I am going to oVer 6-6-6, because this [negotiation/guy] pisses me oV
Happiness I am going to oVer 6-6-6, because I feel good about this [negotiation/guy]
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the three issues were highly correlated and were therefore
averaged into a single index (D .82).
To check the manipulation of the opponent’s emotion,
participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale how
angry, irritated, happy, and satisWed they thought their
opponent had been during the negotiation. The items
designed to measure perceived anger and irritation corre-
lated substantially (r D .85) and were averaged into an index
of perceived anger. The items pertaining to happiness and
satisfaction were combined into an index of perceived hap-
piness (r D .89).
To check the manipulation of the target of the oppo-
nent’s emotion, we asked participants to indicate on 9-
point scales (1 D strongly disagree to 9 D strongly agree)
how much they agreed with two statements, namely “The
emotions of the buyer were directed at me personally” and
“The emotions of the buyer were directed at my behavior.”
The ratings were strongly negatively correlated (r D¡.71),
so we recoded the latter and averaged both ratings into one
index of perceived person-directedness of opponent’s
emotion.
Results
Manipulation checks
We submitted the participants’ ratings of their oppo-
nent’s anger and happiness to a 2 (opponent’s emotion:
anger vs. happiness) £ 2 (target: behavior vs. person)£ 2
(rated emotion: anger vs. happiness) ANOVA, the latter
variable being a within-participants factor. Results showed
the predicted interaction between the opponent’s emotion
and the participants’ perception of the opponent’s emotion,
F(1, 77) D 443.76, p < .001 (2 D .85). Participants in the
angry opponent condition rated their opponents as signiW-
cantly more angry than did participants in the happy oppo-
nent condition (M D 7.30, SD D 1.71 vs. M D 2.26,
SD D 0.90). Similarly, participants with a happy opponent
rated the opponent as happier than did participants with an
angry opponent (M D 6.96, SD D 1.15 vs. M D 2.14,
SD D 0.97). Further, paired-sample t tests revealed that rat-
ings within the diVerent emotion conditions were higher for
the intended emotion than for the other emotion: Partici-
pants in the angry opponent condition rated the opponent
as more angry than happy, t(39) D 5.16, p < .001, and those
in the happy opponent condition rated the opponent as
more happy than angry, t(40) D 4.71, p < .001. There wereno eVects of the target manipulation. Together, these results
indicate that the manipulation of the opponent’s emotion
was successful.
To check whether the target manipulation was success-
ful, we submitted the index of person-directedness of the
opponent’s emotion to a 2 (emotion: anger vs.
happiness) £ 2 (target: behavior vs. person) between-partic-
ipants ANOVA. A main eVect of target revealed that our
target manipulation was successful, F(1,77) D 29.35, p < .001
(2 D .28). Participants in the behavior-oriented emotion
condition reported less person-directedness of their
opponents’ emotions than did participants in the person-
directed emotion condition (M D 2.62, SD D 1.26 vs.
M D 4.65, SD D 2.00). There were no eVects of the emotion
manipulation.
Demands
A 2 (emotion: anger vs. happiness) £ 2 (target: behavior
vs. person) ANOVA on demands showed no main eVects
(both Fs <1.3, ns). However, results did reveal the predicted
interaction between the opponent’s emotion and the target
of the emotion, F(1, 77) D 12.45, p < .001 (2 D .14). The
means and standard deviations reported in Table 3 reveal a
pattern of interaction which is consistent with our predic-
tions. In line with Hypothesis 1a, simple-eVects analysis
revealed that behavior-oriented anger elicited larger con-
cessions (lower demands) than did behavior-oriented hap-
piness, F(1,77) D 8.14, p < .01 (2 D .16). Conversely, and
consistent with Hypothesis 1b, person-directed anger elic-
ited smaller concessions (higher demands) than did person-
directed happiness, F(1, 77) D 4.59, p < .05 (2 D .12).
Appraisal of the opponent’s limits
We hypothesized that behavior-oriented—but not per-
son-directed—emotions would aVect participants’ apprais-
als of the opponent’s limits. In line with this prediction, a 2
(emotion: anger vs. happiness) £ 2 (target: behavior vs. per-
son) ANOVA revealed a two-way interaction on appraisal
of the opponent’s limit, F(1, 77) D 6.76, p < .02 (2 D .08).
Supporting Hypothesis 2, simple-eVects analyses revealed
that in the behavior-oriented emotion condition anger was
associated with more ambitious limits than happiness,
F(1, 77) D 5.43, p < .03 (2 D .16). When directed towards the
person, however, anger and happiness were not associated
with diVerent limits, F(1, 77) D 1.83, ns (2 D .04). Means and
standard deviations are shown in Table 3.Table 3
Demands and appraisal of opponent’s limits as a function of the opponent’s emotion and the target of the emotion
Note. Means not sharing the same subscript diVer at p < .05. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Dependent measure Experimental condition
Behavior-oriented anger Behavior-oriented happiness Person-directed anger Person-directed happiness
Demands 499a (91) 571b (76) 582b (61) 528ab (90)
Appraisal of the opponent’s limits 5.00a (0.54) 4.53b (0.57) 4.56b (0.86) 4.83ab (0.55)
W. Steinel et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 362–369 367Mediation analysis
So far we have shown that the opponent’s emotions
aVected the focal negotiator in predicted ways (Hypotheses
1a and 1b), and that the opponent’s emotion inXuenced
participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits in the
behavior-oriented emotion condition but not in the person-
directed emotion condition (Hypothesis 2). We performed
two sets of mediated regression analyses to test our Wnal
prediction, namely that the eVects of the opponent’s emo-
tion on demands are mediated by appraisals of the oppo-
nent’s limits in the behavior-oriented emotion condition
but not in the person-directed emotion condition (Hypoth-
esis 3). To support this prediction, we should Wnd mediation
of appraisal of the opponent’s limits in the behavior-ori-
ented emotion condition, but not in the person-directed
emotion condition.
To establish mediation, the following conditions should
be satisWed (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, the indepen-
dent variable (opponent’s emotion) should aVect the depen-
dent variable (demands). Second, the independent variable
should aVect the proposed mediator (appraisal of oppo-
nent’s limit). Third, the mediator should be associated with
the dependent variable. Fourth, to establish full mediation,
the eVect of the independent variable on the dependent var-
iable should become non-signiWcant when controlling for
the mediator, and this reduction should be signiWcant.
In the behavior-oriented emotion condition, we found a
signiWcant eVect of the opponent’s emotion on demands,
D .40, p < .01, and a signiWcant eVect of the opponent’s
emotion on appraisal of the opponent’s limit, D ¡.40,
p < .01. Adding appraisal of the other’s limit to the equation
produced a signiWcant eVect of appraisal of the opponent’s
limit on demands, D¡.58, p < .001, and reduced the for-
merly signiWcant eVect of opponent’s emotion on demands
to non-signiWcance, D .17, ns. A Sobel test revealed that
this reduction was signiWcant, Z D 2.29, p < .03. In keeping
with Hypothesis 3, these data indicate that, in the behavior-
oriented emotion condition, the eVect of the opponent’s
emotion on demands is fully mediated by appraisal of the
opponent’s limit. In the person-directed emotion condition,
in contrast, the eVect of the opponent’s emotion on
appraisal of their limit was not signiWcant, D .19, ns, and
accordingly appraisal of the opponent’s limits did not
mediate the eVect.
Discussion
Recent studies have shown that emotions play a crucial
role in negotiations. However, previous results are ambigu-
ous regarding the nature of the interpersonal eVects of
anger and happiness—some studies indicate that expres-
sions of anger may be eVective in eliciting concessions (e.g.,
Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b),
whereas other studies suggest that expressions of anger may
actually reduce concessions (e.g., Friedman et al., 2004;
Kopelman et al., 2006). We propose to diVerentiate betweenbehavior-oriented emotions (i.e., emotions directed toward a
negotiator’s oVers and behavior) and person-directed emo-
tions (i.e., emotions directed toward the negotiator as a per-
son) to gain more understanding of the complex
interpersonal eVects of emotions in negotiations. As pre-
dicted, we found that negotiators conceded more when
their counterpart expressed behavior-oriented anger rather
than happiness, whereas they conceded less when the
counterpart expressed person-directed anger rather than
happiness.
The Wndings also speak to an underlying process. We
reasoned that negotiators’ natural tendency to respond
competitively to a counterpart’s expressions of anger (e.g.,
Allred et al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al.,
2006) may be overruled by strategic considerations when
the emotion contains clear strategic information. Indeed,
we found that behavior-directed emotions had more clear-
cut strategic implications than did person-directed emo-
tions. More speciWcally we found that behavior-oriented
anger (as compared to happiness) raised negotiator’s esti-
mates of their counterpart’s limits and thereby elicited con-
cessions. In contrast, person-directed anger did not have an
eVect on appraisals of the other’s limits, and consequently
negotiators conceded less rather than more to a counter-
part’s person-directed anger. It appears that when anger
has clear strategic implications, as is the case when it is
behavior-oriented, it may help negotiators to extract con-
cessions. If the strategic implications of the anger are
unclear, however, as is the case when the anger is person-
directed, the anger may provoke competitive responses.
The Wnding that the target of an emotion moderates its
interpersonal eVects has important implications for theoriz-
ing about the social eVects of emotions. Van Kleef (in press)
recently introduced the Emotions as Social Information
(EASI) model to account for the interpersonal eVects of
emotions in social interaction. The model posits that emo-
tional expressions may exert interpersonal inXuence
through two distinct paths, one involving aVective reac-
tions, and the other involving strategic considerations. The
model predicts that anger is more likely to elicit concessions
to the extent that it is perceived as appropriate and observ-
ers have a high information processing motivation, whereas
it is more likely to elicit competition when it is deemed
inappropriate and observers have a low information pro-
cessing motivation. In the former case, people are more
likely to act on the strategic information they distill from
the anger, whereas in the latter case they are more likely to
act on their competitive tendencies. The present study sug-
gests that the target of the emotion should be considered as
well, because it may determine the usefulness and diagnos-
ticity of the information that is carried by the emotion.
More generally, the present Wndings stress the role of
context in determining the social eVects of emotions.
Depending on the social context, emotional expressions
may become more or less diagnostic. Extrapolating the cur-
rent Wndings to other characteristics of emotional expres-
sion, it can be expected that, for instance, anger may have
368 W. Steinel et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 362–369diVerent eVects depending on when it is expressed. When
anger is expressed directly after an incidence of unjust
treatment, for example, it is likely to be attributed to that
incidence, whereas if the anger is expressed considerably
later it may be connected to another event, such as a broken
elevator. Observers’ (behavioral) responses to the same
expression of anger may thus depend critically on the con-
nection they make between the anger expression and the
situation.
Finally, from a practical perspective it is important to
realize that expressing anger or happiness can have tre-
mendously diVerent eVects in a negotiation, depending on
the target of the emotion. Expressing anger can pay oV,
but only when the anger is directed at a negotiator’s
behavior. When the anger is directed at the negotiator as a
person, it is likely to elicit competitive reactions. In this
light, Fisher and Ury’s (1981) recommendation to
“separate the people from the problem” seems especially
relevant when negotiations evoke negative emotions. A
negotiator who experiences positive emotions, in contrast,
would be better advised to express them in a way that
does not diVerentiate between the problem and the people.
Happy negotiators who follow this advice may reap the
beneWts in various ways. If negotiators direct their happi-
ness at their counterpart as a person, they (1) do not give
away strategic information about their negotiation posi-
tion, and (2) they may be rewarded with reciprocal coop-
eration.
The main objective of this study was to show that emo-
tions have diVerent eVects on negotiation behavior depend-
ing on whether they are targeted at a negotiator’s oVer or at
the negotiator as a person. A limitation of this approach is
that the eVects cannot be clearly attributed to either anger,
or happiness, or both. The present study lacks a non-emo-
tional control condition, as the distinction between behav-
ior-oriented and person-directed emotions cannot be made
when no emotions are expressed. Previous research that did
not distinguish between the two targets of emotion has
included non-emotional control conditions and has consis-
tently found these conditions to fall in the middle of the
anger and happiness conditions (Van Kleef et al., 2004a,
2004b).
Participants in the present study did not engage in face-
to-face interaction. We decided to test our predictions in a
computer-simulated negotiation task because it allowed us
to vary the target of the opponent’s emotional expressions
in a clear and systematic way, without compromising the
experimental control that we deemed necessary to obtain a
carefully controlled test of our hypotheses. Previous
research has shown that this task yields data that are simi-
lar to data obtained in Weld settings (Van Kleef, De Dreu,
Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006) and face-to-face negotiations
(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), so we are conWdent in the gen-
eralizability of the Wndings. Nevertheless, it would be inter-
esting to investigate how the dynamics uncovered in the
present study play out in face-to-face negotiations. This
issue could be addressed in future research.Recent research has shown that other emotions besides
anger and happiness also exert powerful interpersonal
inXuence in conXict and negotiation. For example, Van
Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2006) showed that negotia-
tors concede more value to disappointed or worried coun-
terparts than to guilty or regretful ones. It would be
interesting to extrapolate the current exercise to these and
other emotions. It is conceivable, for instance, that saying
“I am disappointed by your last oVer” has diVerent eVects
from saying “I am disappointed in you.” Future research
could examine this and other possibilities.
In conclusion, we showed that behavior-oriented anger
elicited more cooperation than behavior-oriented happiness,
whereas person-directed anger elicited less cooperation than
person-directed happiness. This reversal could be attributed
to the strategic value of the emotional expression, which was
higher in the behavior-oriented condition than in the per-
son-directed condition. These Wndings demonstrate that the
interpersonal eVects of anger and happiness in negotiation
depend critically on the target of the emotion—a conclusion
that has important implications for the understanding of the
role of emotions in conXict and negotiation, and for the
social eVects of emotions in general.
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